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Porter 1

A Modern Look at Social Trinitarianism
Christopher Thomas Porter
I. Introduction
In this paper I will attempt to show through the modern literature that Social
Trinitarianism (ST) is a more plausible explanation of the Trinity than Latin
Trinitarianism (LT). The primary issues explored here will be Latin
Trinitarianism’s tendency to mimic modalism and Social Trinitarianism’s issue of
procession. I will focus on essays written in response to Keith Ward’s Christ and
the Cosmos. I will also offer a proposal of how to view the Trinity through the
combination of the methodology proposed by H. E. Barber and Richard
Swinburne’s view of necessity and procession.

II. LT’s Issue of Modes over Minds
In his essay Reimagining the Trinity: On Not Three Gods, Keith Ward attempts
to offer a revised version of how we should view the Trinity. While he offers some
new ideas, the basic premise of his argument is not new. His argument is what is
known as Latin, Unitarian, or Augustine Trinitarianism (for our purposes we shall
refer to it as Latin Trinitarianism or LT); which is in contrast to the Social
Trinitarian view (ST). The goal of LT is to “begin from the oneness of God, and try
to explain just how one God can be three divine Persons,” while the goal of ST is
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to begin with the three distinct Persons and explain how they are one God.1 Ward’s
basic assumption regarding the Trinity is the same as Karl Barth and Karl Rahner’s
theory that
‘mode of being’ (seinsweise) or ‘mode of subsistence’ (subsistenzweise)
[should] replace the patristic concept of ‘person’. Instead of speaking of
three persons in one substance, they suggest that one could speak of one
mind and will with three distinct but closely related, indeed inseparable,
ways of existing.2
From the outset of Ward’s argument, the similarities to modalism begin to be seen.
Granting the benefit of the doubt, that Ward’s arguments are not straight-forward
modalism, there is another danger in accepting the above premise.
Denying the belief in three minds and wills of the Godhead (a belief accepted
by most Social Trinitarians) is problematic if you also hold that there are three
“modes” of the Trinity. Consider the following: the Latin Trinitarian would affirm
that each mode of the Trinity exists eternally, omnisciently, and omnipotently, yet
they overlap perfectly and infinitely to create one God; in this view, wills and
centers of consciousness (interchangeable with the concept of minds) overlap, it is
the modes that do not overlap. While initially it seems logical that God could have

1
Brian Leftow, “Anti Social Trinitarianism,” Philosophical and Theological Essays on
the Trinity (2009), DOI 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199216215.001.0001 (accessed March 06, 2017).

Keith Ward, “Reimagining the Trinity: On Not Three Gods,” Philosophia Christi 18 no.
2 (2016): 283.
2
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only one will and mind that all the “modes” would partake of equally, it is not clear
how the Latin Trinitarian could distinguish the threeness of the “modes”
themselves. My objection has more to do with the rejection of the centers of
consciousness (or mind) than that of the wills, as theologically these two points
have different applications to the Godhead.
To demonstrate my objection, consider, if there are three aspects of God and
yet they have one will and one center of consciousness (or mind) then what
distinguishes them? It cannot be by their wills (if there is only one will), it cannot
be by a distinction between their centers of consciousness (because there is only
one), and because they all are equally eternal, omniscient, and omnipotent it can’t
be a unique characteristic that one of them possesses. The only possible explanation
for how to distinguish the aspects of God would be by their interaction and
engagement with creation (also known as economical trinitarian relations). In other
words the only way to distinguish the aspects of the Trinity would be by their
actions, and the only way that we can know of distinct actions they take is through
their interaction with creation (whereas any interaction within the Trinity itself is
difficult, if not impossible, to know apart from direct revelation); and this is
dangerous to the very notion of the Trinity. As I will demonstrate, this progression
leads not only to God being reliant upon creation, but creation being a necessary
part of God’s existence. This objection is not unique except that it is presented here
as an objection.
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Ward actually uses this claim in his attempts to make his argument. He says,
“The way God relates to humans, in creating, redeeming, and sanctifying them, is
the way God really and essentially is.”3 He then goes on to make the glaring
implication of this statement, “That seems to imply that God must create,
participate in creation, and unite creatures to the divine life, and that there is no life
of God beyond this activity.”4 He offers no further argument to support what
appears to be the dangerous implication that God is not complete without his
creation and even says that the counter statement that, “God would have been
perfect and complete without creation… could never be established by reason, and
it is not mentioned in the scriptures.”5
Once Ward rejects that God has three minds he is left with no alternative than
to imply that God’s action through creation is who He is. By doing so, Ward’s LT
makes each member of the Trinity’s existence subject to the actions they take and
reliant upon them in some way. Without creation, the Father (first person of the
Trinity, later referenced as FPT) would not have something to govern; without the
Fall, the Son would not need to become incarnate; without the continual restoration
of mankind, the Holy Spirit would have no obvious purpose upon which to act; and
no action (extrapolating from Ward’s logic) implies non-existence or at least the

3

Ward, 283.

4

Ibid., 283.

5

Ibid, 284.
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non-materializing of a “mode” of the Godhead. In a response to Ward’s larger
essay, Christ and the Cosmos, Stephen Davis notes that, “…the specter of modalism
seems to me to emerge in Ward’s account of the Trinity.”6 The idea the that
Godhead would have modes of actualizing based on their actions seems to exude
modalism, and if it is the case that God does not need creation to exist then it seems
incomprehensible how a Latin Trinitarian could claim there to be a distinction
between the three modes. This leaves Latin Trinitarians holding the doublestandard that there are three modes, but not three minds, and thus they are unable
to explain how the one mind and one will could possibly be three Persons.
Another way to show that God’s reliance upon creation is difficult to rectify is
to consider what the roles of the Trinity would have been prior to creation. Indeed,
the Father (FPT) could have existed because He would have eternally known
creation and eternally governed what it would be like (this is a stretch, but I’m
attempting to find ways to accommodate these theories). However, the Son and
Holy Ghost seem to have no action which we could “assign” to them in regards to
the still unmade creation, and thus there results an absence of purpose to act upon,
which Ward seems to claim is necessary for each aspect’s existence. This seems to
imply straight-forward modalism and is dangerous to the very existence of God
Himself. The other question that arises from the idea that God requires creation is,

Stephen T. Davis, “Comments on Keith Ward’s Christ and the Cosmos,” Philosophia
Christi 18 no. 2 (2016): 311.
6
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Why are there only three modes of God? Hypothetically, if there was another action
that needed to be accomplished regarding creation, would it not be true that God
could manifest himself in four or more modes? Ward does not seem to offer a
response to this in his Rethinking the Trinity essay.

III. Necessity and Procession of ST
In contrast to Keith Ward and Latin Trinitarianism is Richard Swinburne, a selfproclaimed Social Trinitarian. In his essay, Response to Keith Ward, Christ and the
Cosmos, Swinburne addresses why three centers of consciousness (three minds)
gives the best explanation of the Trinity. In addressing this matter, Swinburne
believes, as I, that Ward’s denial of the three centers of consciousness and his
affirming of only one will and one mind preforming the acts of creation, salvation,
and sanctification is modalism.7
Swinburne’s view is founded on 1 John 4:8 “…God is love.” (NIV). The key
concept is that “[in solitude a] being cannot love.”8 I accept this as a valid statement
because if love has no way or outlet of being expressed then it is questionable if it
exists. This is different from saying that if love is not expressed then it does not
exist. For indeed a family may never express their love, but it is sure that love exists
because there are various outlets where at times love can be expressed. The

7
Richard Swinburne, “Response to Keith Ward Christ and the Cosmos,” Philosophia
Christi 18 no. 2 (2016): 298.
8

Ibid. 300.
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difference is that in God’s case if there is no way of expressing his love (no other
person or persons), then we can genuinely question if it actually exists. The only
ways in which God can express his love is through economical relations with
creation or through other necessary and uncreated divine beings, and as we have
seen, necessary reliance on creation is dangerous to the existence of some, if not
all, of the members of the Trinity.
Swinburne believes that God’s love is best described as unselfish love to which
he offers the definition of, “Where each lover does whatever is needed to ensure
that there is another being besides himself for the beloved to love.”9 This would
mean that the love of the first person of the Trinity would necessitate another being
(the second person of the Trinity) for himself to love. This then would necessitate
a third being which the first person of the Trinity could give to the second person
of the Trinity to love and vice versa. Thus, three is the minimum number for the
fulfillment of unselfish love.10 It would not, however, be necessary to create a 4th,
5th, 6th etc. divine being. Summarizing this Swinburne says, “Hence any cooperative
action of producing more divine beings beyond the Spirit would be voluntary
action, an act of will (rather than an ‘act of essence’…); and in that case the fourth

9

Swinburne, 303.

10

Ibid.
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being would not—unlike the first three beings—exist of necessity, and so could not
be divine.”11
One point of clarification must be made regarding the manner in which Ward
and Swinburne view the necessities of God. Ward, as we have seen, seems to imply
that God necessitates creation, but creation has not always existed as explored
above, and so another question must be posed, Was God imperfect during the period
in which there was no creation? This statement seems to be inconsistent with both
logic and scriptural references. On the other hand, Swinburne believes that, given
three distinct centers of consciousness (minds), as ST holds, it follows that the
Father (FPT) necessitates the Son and consequently the Spirit. The objection I wish
to dispel here is that these two concepts, the necessity of creation and the necessity
of other divine beings, may in some way be logically the same. The major
distinction is the matter of eternity. Orthodox Christians will hold that creation has
not existed for all time and this causes trouble for Ward on his point. Swinburne’s
theory on the other hand has its merit in the fact that the Son and Holy Ghost have
always existed, and if they have always existed then even if the Father (FPT) is the
progenitor of the other persons there is no need for there to have been any moment
in time where the three did not all exist at once. Thus, the idea of necessity is not
the same in Ward’s and Swinburne’s theories.

11

Swinburne, 303.
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IV. Davis on Priority and Procession
I appreciate Stephen Davis’ remarks regarding Ward’s essay, as Davis does not
necessarily take LT or ST’s side. Davis first lays out a few presuppositions Social
Trinitarians must accept:
1) Each Person equally possesses the divine essence in its totality,
2) The three Persons necessarily share a marvelous unity of purpose, will and
action,
3) They exists in perichoresis12
Perichoresis is the idea that each person in the Trinity, through love
“ontologically embraces the other; that the boundaries between the persons are
transparent, that their mutual indwelling is such that each Person knowns and feels
all that the other two know and feel.”13 To preserve threeness, Social Trinitarians
must accept the Father (FPT) as the “fount of divination”14 and that the Son and
Spirit flow from the Father (FPT). Davis believes that if one accepts the Father
(FPT) to be the “fount of divination,” this implies the Father (FPT) would be
superior to the others because they would be equal in all ways except for the
creation of the other two.

12

Davis, 310.

13

Ibid.

14

Ibid.
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In brief, my objection to this is that Davis misunderstands the terms used to
describe procession. His argument does not understand that, because the Father’s
(FPT) being necessitates the being of the others, He does not “do” anything that the
others do not. It is not a direct action by which the Father (FPT) brings forth the
Son and Spirit. Davis does clarify that he believes, “The Father does beget the Son,
but I deny that the Father (non-causally and non-temporally) creates the Son and
Spirit….”15 The latter, that “the Father… creates the Son and Spirit,” Davis says, is
the stance of Swinburne’s ST, and if Davis is correct I would agree with him for
the sole reason of the word “creates.” I do not believe that the Father (FPT)
“creates” the Son and Spirit, but simply that the Father (FPT) is the starting point
of the necessity from which the Trinity flows.
Davis does accept that if the Father (FPT) has a “priority” to the others, “It has
to do with the proper place to begin an explanation of who God is.”16 I would
completely agree with this statement. Yet, I believe that Davis misses the
connection between his statement and that of Swinburne. The Father (FPT) is the
necessary place to begin discussion of who God is, because the Father (FPT) is the
progenitor (not creator) of the other necessary Trinitarian Persons. You must begin

15

Davis, 311.

16

Ibid.
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with the Father (FPT) to explain Swinburne’s theory of the necessity of Trinitarian
Persons through love.

V. Baber’s Methodology
As described above, Swinburne believes in the necessity of the Son and the
Spirit given the love and eternal being of the Father (FPT). This brings up another
point of contention between Latin and Social Trinitarians: What exactly do the
terms Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Trinity and God mean? Above I have used the term
FPT to indicate that “Father” means the first person of the Trinity, but now I will
present H. E. Baber’s methodology which attempts to give a better explanation of
the terms and will change how the term “Father” is being used. H. E. Baber, a
professor at the University of San Diego, wrote an essay entitled Trinity, Filioque
and Semantic Ascent. I want to focus on her proposed methodological account of
the definition of each aspect of the Trinity. I propose that she has a brilliant concept,
which, when combined with Richard Swinburne’s necessity of the persons, creates
a new and theologically acceptable picture of the Trinity.
Baber notes, “The chief difficulty… in any account of the Trinity, is that of
squaring [equality] and [asymmetry of processions].”17 Essentially, that the persons
of the Trinity must be equal in every way and yet how they proceed must not be the

H. E. Baber, “Trinity, Filioque and Semantic Assent,” Sophia 47 (July 16, 2008), DOI
10.1007/s11841-008-0061-8 (accessed April 24, 2017): 150.
17
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same. Baber uses five terms; Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Trinity, and God. The last
four are less important than the first, but I will give the best definition for the last
four as relates to Baber’s methodology. “Son” and “Holy Spirit” mean the second
and third persons of the Trinity, respectively. “God” would be the divine essence
or nature of the divine. “Trinity” is the term used to signify we are generically
speaking about all members of the Godhead at the same time. However, when we
talk about Father,
“‘Father’ is ambiguous and when it occurs in ‘theological’ contexts, where the
internal relations of Trinitarian persons are under consideration, it refers to the
Trinity in toto.” [On the other hand,] “…when the Creed says that ‘God the
Father Almighty’ is the Maker of Heaven and Earth, or Jesus addresses his
‘Father’ in heaven or the Litany invokes ‘God the Father, Creator of heaven and
earth,’ ‘Father’ refers to the first person of the Trinity.”18
For sake of space I will not detail the logic of Baber’s argument, but will attempt
to summarize it and then will present my theory of the new model of the Trinity.
The key to Baber’s position is quite clearly the term “Father.” First, Baber, as would
most Orthodox Christians, accepts that the Father (FPT) does not proceed from
anything. Now, with this said, Baber’s logic using Father to represent the Trinity in
toto allows us to say that the Son and Spirit proceed from somewhere, and yet rids

18

Baber, 153-154.
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us of the issue of inequality. This seems to solve the issue of procession for ST, for
each Trinitarian Person asymmetrically proceeds and yet they are all equal. Baber
proposes that using “Father” to mean the Trinity in toto would allow us to say:
1a) The Father [First Person of the Trinity], Son and Holy Spirit are, in every
respect, equally God.
2a) The Son is begotten of the Father [Trinity in toto].
3a) The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father [Trinity in toto].19
Also, both the Son and the Holy Spirit have a P-relationship20 with the “Father”
(Trinity in toto). The final conclusion that it seems we could draw is the:
4a) Father (FPT) has a P-relationship with the Father (Trinity in toto)
What 4) says then is that the first person of the Trinity bears some kind of
proceeding relation with the Trinity, however, this is wrong because as mentioned
before, Baber believes the first person of the Trinity does not proceed from
anything, which means that 4a) is false. She goes on to note that the only theological
loss from this would be the controversial Filioque clause which states,

19

Numbered bullets represent the order in this paper, not Baber’s, Ibid. 154.

P-relations is “Theological discourse about Trinitarian processions…” and it means
the “…relations that Trinitarian persons bear to the Trinity…” (Ibid. 155) Essentially, each
member of the Trinity bears some kind of relationship with the Trinity in toto regarding how they
proceed from it and this relationship they hold is called the P-relationship. Yet, members of the
Trinity does not have P-relationships with other members of the Trinity. In the same way a
basketball player has certain type of relationship with his basketball team as an organization, but a
different type of relationship with each player on the team.
20
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5a) The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.21
Now, I propose that if you take Baber’s proposed methodology and overlay the
necessity of the persons by Swinburne you come up with a new and yet
theologically acceptable view of the Trinity (See figure below).

Key
Necessity

Father

Procession

1

“Father”
(Trinity
in toto)
2

Son

3

Holy Spirit

God
In the diagram above the Father (FPT), Son, and Holy Spirit are in the three
corners of the triangle to represent each person of the Trinity. The numbers next to
them represent the order needed to demonstrate Swinburne’s necessity of the divine

21
In this we are talking about a proceeding relationship (a P-relationship). While it is fine
to say the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father (Trinity in toto), we cannot say that the Holy Spirit
proceeds from the Son or from the Father (FPT) because Trinitarian Persons in Baber’s
methodology cannot have P-relationships with other Trinitarian Persons.
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beings from his concept of love; the solid lines connect the numbers to show this
necessity. Surrounding the Triangle is “God” simply meant to indicate the essence
of the Godhead. Finally, in the center “Father” (Trinity in toto) is used to represent
that from the existence of the Trinity the Son and Holy Spirit proceed (dotted lines).
The main objection that Baber’s idea encounters is similar to an objection
against ST by Brian Leftow, a proponent of LT. Leftow objects to Social
Trinitarianism by claiming that it creates something he calls “group mind
monotheism.”22 Now, Baber’s methodology and the object of Leftow’s objection
are not identical, but are enough to consider the objection. Leftow’s objection is to
the a concept of the “…Trinity as a sort of group mind, an agent and knower who
while not a fourth Person (i.e. divine substance, or case of deity) is still more than
a mere collection of Persons.”23 Essentially, the Trinity is a fourth mind. If “Father”,
as Baber uses it, represents the Trinity in toto, it would seem that this creates a
fourth mind from which the Son and Spirit proceed and that is distinct from the first
person of “Trinity.” For the sake of space and time I will not here lay out the entirety
of the response, but I do propose that this is simply a misunderstanding of what is
meant by the “Trinity”. Essentially the Trinity in toto refers to the entirety of the
Godhead. If in fact Swinburne is correct in the necessity of each of the persons of
the Godhead, to say that the Son and Spirit proceed from the Godhead would be to

22

Leftow, 7.

23

Ibid, 13.
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say that the Son and Spirit proceed necessarily from the Trinity in toto. I believe
this to be the only issue that Baber will run into here regarding the concept of the
Trinity.

VI. Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown that Social Trinitarianism allows the Christian to
speak of the Trinity in a way that expresses God as three distinct persons, but only
one true God. I have also shown that Latin Trinitarianism, especially in the modern
context, comes too close to modalism for the Christian to accept. Finally, I have
proposed a new way of expressing how the Trinity functions using Baber’s
methodology and Swinburne’s necessary procession. With Social Trinitarianism,
all the requirements of being truly Trinitarian are met without falling on the concept
of tri-theism, where there are three gods. Given this account, I hold that Social
Trinitarianism is the most plausible explanation given the modern arguments.
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